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COMMENTS
SECTION I12(b)(6): BENEFIT OR BURDEN?
RAYMOND WHITEAKER*

The general provision in the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to

the liquidation of corporations is section 115 (c). Under this section
gain or loss on a liquidation is recognized to the extent that the assets
received in liquidation exceed or fail to exceed the basis of the shareholder's stock. An exception to this general rule, however, is provided
by section 112(b) (6) whereby a parent may liquidate a subsidiary
without recognizing any gain or loss on the liquidation if the statutory
requirements are met.
HistoricalBackground and Purpose of Section 112(b) (6)
The nonrecognition provision first appeared in the Revenue Act of
1935 as section 110 (a).' This original provision was unsatisfactory 2 and
was succeeded by section 112 (b) (6) of the Revenue Act of 19363 which
has survived succeeding revenue acts unchanged. 4
The purpose of the nonrecognition provision was to encourage the
simplification of corporate structures by allowing corporations to
liquidate their subsidiaries without paying excessive penalties in the
process.5 The intent was not to exempt gains entirely, but merely to
postpone recognition thereof until such time as they might be voluntarily realized. The underlying purpose was, thus, to assist and refrain
from penalizing a parent that wished to liquidate a subsidiary by
allowing it to do so without being subject to any immediate tax as a
result thereof. Probably in the majority of situations section 112 (b) (6)
will benefit the parent corporation as Congress intended. However, in
a number of instances it has proved to be quite a burden and rather
costly taxwise to those corporate parents that have proceeded to
* LL.M. in Taxation, New York University; former Graduate Editor, Tax
Law Review; associate, Barksdale & Hudgins, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 49

STAT.

1014, 1020 (1935).

2. See Colgan and Molloy, Tax-Free Liquidations Of CorporateSubsidiaries
Under Section 112(b) (6) Of the InternalRevenue Code, 4 TAX L. REV. 305, 306
(1949).
3. 49 STAT. 1648, 1679 (1936).
4. For a treatment of the background and enactment of section 112(b) (6)
see Friedman, All Cash Distributions Under Section 112(b) (6), 8 TAX L. REV.
369, 370 (1953).
5. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Co., 316 U.S. 107, 112, 62 Sup. Ct. 989, 86
L. Ed. 1307 (1942); Commissioner v. Kay Mfg. Corp., 122 F.2d 443, 445 (2d
Cir. 1941); International Investment Corp., 11 T.C. 678, 683 (1948); SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or FEDERAL INcOME TAX LAWS 240-43 (1938); Colgan and
Molloy, supra note 2, at 305.
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liquidate without being aware of its restrictive provisions. It is the
purpose of this article to illustrate the normal application of section
112 (b) (6) as a benefit to the parent as contrasted with the situations
where the parent desires to reject the "benefit" of nonrecognition.
The Statute
In order for a parent to bring itself within the provisions of section
112(b) (6) it must comply with the technical requirements of the
statute. The first requirement is that on adoption of the plan of liquidation, and at all times until the receipt of the property, the parent
must be the owner of stock in the liquidating subsidiary to the extent
of at least 80 per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote, and of at least 80 per cent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock except nonvoting stock which is
limited and preferred as to dividends. Nor may the corporation own,
at any time between the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation
and the receipt of the property, a greater percentage of any one class
of stock than the percentage owned at the time of receipt of the
property. 6 Finally, there must be either a complete liquidation in7
which the transfer of all the property occurs within the taxable year
or one of a series of distributions under which the transfer of all the
property under the liquidation is to be completed within three years
from the close of the taxable year in which the first distribution was
made.8
The section has no effect on the tax liability of minority shareholders.9
The companion basis provision is section 113 (a) (15), which also
had its origin in the Revenue Act of 1936.10 It provides that the assets
received in liquidation shall have the same basis in the hands of the
parent as they had in the hands of the liquidating subsidiary." In
certain cases, however, this section may produce an incongruous result in that it permanently eliminates any gain or loss inhering in the
subsidiary's stock.12
6. INT. REV. CODE § 112(b) (6) (A); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (6)-1
(1953).
7. IxT. REv. CODE § 112(b) (6) (C); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (6) -2
(1953).
8. INT. REV. CODE § 112(b) (6) (D); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (6) -3
(1953).

9. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (6)-4 (1953).
10. 49 STAT. 1648, 1684 (1936).
11. Prior to the enactment of section 113 (a) (15) the rule was that the basis
of the assets in the parent's hands was the cost of the stock to it. This rule involved administrative difficulties as the basis of the stock of the parent had to
be allocated among the assets received from the subsidiary and was, thus,
abandoned.
12. For example, assume that X owns stock in Y at a cost basis of $8,000. Y
is completely liquidated and dissolved within the year and turns over the
assets which on its books have a basis of $13,000. X surrenders stock and
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Section 112(b) (6): A Benejt
A typical case illustrating the benefit of section 112 (b) (6) to a cbrporate parent on the liquidation of its subsidiary is Metal Office Furniture Co.23 In that case P owned all the stock of S except that owned
by K. The latter sold all of its stock to P by an oral agreement in
October of 1936. Although delivery of the certificates was not made
until December 29, 1936, both parties stood ready, willing and able
to perform at all times. S was liquidated on December 31, 1936. P
reported no gain on the liquidation contending that it was pursuant
to section 112 (b) (6) and gain was free from recognition. The Commissioner took the position that gain on the liquidation was taxable
since P was not the owner of more than 80 per cent of the voting stock
of S at the time the plan was adopted as required by statute. 14 The
decision Was in favor of the taxpayer on the theory that the purchase
of the minority interest in the stock was a closed transaction in October of 1936. P thus owned 100 per cent of the voting stock of S prior
to the adoption of the plan of liquidation and continued to own such
stock until the receipt of the property in liquidation. Accordingly
the liquidation was nontaxable under section 112 (b) (6).15
In the above case the Commissioner determined that P had realized
a gain of $163,919 on the liquidation of S. The plan might never have
been proposed if P had known that it would be subject to an immediate
tax on this amount. Thus, P appears to have properly availed itself
of the Congressional intent of encouraging the simplification of corporate structures through the elimination of subsidiaries.
Section 112(b) (6): A Burden
In many cases, however, the situation is such that the parent corporation does not wish to come within the bounds of section 112 (b) (6).
Generally this problem arises when there has been a loss on the liquidation which the parent wishes to recognize,' 6 or when the assets have
a low basis in the hands of the subsidiary and the parent would prefer
7
to pay a tax on the gain to obtain a "stepped up" basis for the assets.'
realizes no gain. The basis of the assets to X is the basis in Y's hands, or
$13,000. X has thus acquired a stepped-up basis of $5,000 on which it will never
bd taxed. Under the previous rule referred to in note 11 supra, this result
would not have been possible.
13. P-H 1942 BTA-TC Myim. DEc. ff 42,337 (1942).
14. INT. REv. CoDE § 112 (b) (6) (A).
15. See also Helvering v. Credit Alliance Co., 316 U.S. 107, 62 Sup. Ct. 989,
86 L. Ed. 1307 (1942); Oregon Land and Livestock Co., P-H 1943 TC ivlmv.
DEc. ff 43,504 (1943).
16. Suppose that corporation A forms corporation B with a capital of
$100,000, and that B sustains operating losses of $50,000. Under a 112(b) (6)
liquidation A would not be able to recognize this loss.
17. Thus if A purchased the stock of B for $100,000 and B had assets with
a basis of $60,000 and a fair market value of $120,000, A would acquire the
assets in a section 112(b) (6) liquidation at the lower figure of $60,000: A
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Escaping the nonrecognition consequences of section 112 (b) (6) may
be a formidable task in the absence of competent advice and advance
planning. The difficulties that have been experienced can best be
illustrated by a discussion of a few of the cases.
In International Investment Corp.18 P's wholly owned subsidiary
sold all of its assets during the taxable year, dissolved and distributed
the cash resulting from the sale together with other cash to P in cancellation of its stock held by P. P's adjusted basis for the stock was
$278,680, whereas the total amount of cash received on the liquidation
was $118,364. P desired to recognize the loss and claimed that section
112 (b) (6) did not apply since "the word 'property' as used in the
phrase 'property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation' appearing in section 112 (b) (6) does not include money; and
only money was distributed to petitioner [P] upon the dssolution
and liquidation of its subsidiary."19 The court decided that in view of
the legislative history of section 112 (b) (6)., cash distributions to the
stockholders constituted property.20 The parent was, thus, unsuccessful in its attempt to circumvent section 112 (b) (6) by an all cash
distribution and was not permitted to recognize the loss on the
transaction. 2'
22
In Service Co. v. Commissioner,
P, an Arkansas corporation, owned
all the stock of S. P decided to liquidate S and pursuant to a resolution
or plan by P, as sole shareholder, all the assets were distributed and
received by P. On its return for the year P claimed a long term capital
loss from the liquidation of S. The loss was disallowed. P contested,
claiming that it did not come within section 112 (b) (6) as there was no
"plan of liquidation" as required by statute, nor did it comply with
the provisions of the treasury regulations requiring it to keep records
and submit certain information.23 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that there was no need for a formal plan
of liquidation, it being enough that there was an intention to liquidate
coupled with a distribution to the shareholders. As to the second point
the court stated that strict compliance with the regulations was not
a condition precedent to the application of the statute and that a taxwould ordinarily prefer to pay a tax on the $20,000 gain and acquire the assets
at the higher basis of $120,000.
18. 11 T.C. 678 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 175 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1949).
19. Id. at 681.
20. For a discussion of the problem of whether a cash distribution is
"property" within the meaning of section 112 (b) (6), see Colgan and Molloy,
Tax-Free Liquidations Of Corporate Subsidiaries Under Section 112(b)(6) Of
The Internal Revenue Code, 4 TAx L. REV. 305, 316 (1949). But see Friedman,
All Cash DistributionsUnder Section 112(b) (6), 8 TAx L. REv. 369 (1953).
21. Contra: Stimson Mill Co., 46 B.T.A. 141 (1942).
22. 165 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1948).
23. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (6) -5 (1953).
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payer could not take advantage of its own default or reap a benefit
therefrom. 24
The above cases should serve as a sufficient warning to a parent that
it cannot be too cautious in planning the liquidation of its subsidiary.
In deliberately attempting to disqualify itself only those plans that
have received judicial approval should be attempted. The only reliable methods of avoiding the scope of section 112 (b) (6) are either
by reducing the parent's holding below the 80 per cent level,25 or by
extending the liquidation beyond the statutory three-year period 26

or both.
The former method was successfully utilized in Commissioner v.
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. 27 There P owned more than 80 per cent of
the stock of two subsidiaries, both of which were having financial
difficulties. P decided to liquidate both subsidiaries, but on being apprised of the tax consequences it sold amounts of stock in order to re-,
duce its holdings to less than the 80 per cent required by section
112 (b) (6) (A). Losses of $55,681 and $372,056 sustained on liquidation
were allowed over the objections of the Commissioner. Although the
minority interest in the stock had been sold to the treasurer of the
parent, the evidence disclosed that the transaction was at arm's length
28
and bona fide.

Thus, by intentionally reducing its stock ownership below the 80
per cent requirement either prior to or subsequent to the adoption of
the plan of liquidation, a parent may avoid the application of section
112 (b) (6) (A).29 A similar result was reached in Rhode Island Hos24. A similar case is Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 442 (1947),
affd, 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1948). In that case a parent held 655 out of 810
outstanding shares of stock of S corporation at a cost of $65,000. As the result
of a fire all the assets of S corporation were destroyed and the directors decided to liquidate. Parent sustained a loss of $24,140 on the liquidation which
it sought to deduct as a long term capital loss. The Commissioner disallowed
the loss claiming non-recognition under section 112(b) (6). Parent, however,
contended that there was "no plan of liquidation" and that it did not meet the
requirements of the regulations pertaining to liquidations covering more than
one year. The court held that a plan of liquidation is not a status which can
be assumed or discarded at will, but is a condition brought about by affirmative
action. It further decided that a parent that sustains a loss in connection with
the liquidation of a subsidiary cannot fail to comply with the regulations and
set up such failure in order to claim the loss as a deduction. In such instances
the requirements of the regulations can be waived.
25. INT. REV. CODE § 112 (b) (6) (A). Commissioner v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 7 T.C. 211
(1946).
26. INT. Rav. CODE § 112(b) (6) (D).
27. 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945).
28. It is essential that such a sale be bona fide. If the sale were arranged
merely to avoid section 112(b) (6), the entire transaction may be disregarded
for tax purposes.
29. Colgan and Molloy, Tax-Free Liquidations Of Corporate Subsidiaries
Under Sections 112(b) (6) Of the InternalRevenue Code, 4 TAx L. REv. 305, 334
(1949).
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pital Trust Co.3 0 These cases definitely establish the fact that section
112 (b) (6) is an elective provision which can be utilized or discarded
by the parent as its interests may require, provided that the liquidation
is properly planned. 3 '
The development of another line of cases, however, requires that an
additional caveat be directed to those corporations whose only motive
32
in the purchase of another's stock is to obtain the assets of the latter.
Although it would appear through the application of sections 112 (b)
(6) and 113 (a) (15) tha the parent could acquire the stock and obtain
the assets on liquidation at the same basis that the assets were held
by the liquidating corporation, such is not the case. Where there is a
purchase of stock followed by an immediate liquidation of the acquired
corporation and the price paid for the stock is less than the basis of
the assets, the Commissioner has successfully contended that section
112 (b) (6) does not govern.3 The reliance of the courts has been upon
the "substance against form"34 and the "single transaction" 35 theories.
Actually the consideration of the purchase of the stock of a corporation
and the subsequent liquidation thereof as a single transaction is but a
30. 7 T.C. 211 (1946) Acq. In that case P, a banking corporation, formed a
subsidiary, S, for the purpose of acquiring, operating and disposing of properties covered by P's mortgages. Due to a declining market S suffered substantial operating losses. Shortly before liquidation P disposed of about 25%
of its S stock to an outside individual. It then liquidated and took its loss on
the liquidation. The Commissioner disallowed the loss, contending that the
sale of the stock was not bona fide, that P owned more than 80 per cent of the
S stock and that section 112(b) (6) prevented recognition of the loss. The court
held that under the facts section 112(b) (6) was not applicable.
31. Colgan and Molloy, Tax-Free Liquidations Of Corporate Subsidiaries
Under Section 112(b) (6) Of The Internal Revenue Code, 4 TAx L. REV. 305, 333
(1949).
32. Although the buyer may be interested in a purchase of assets, the owner
mrayonly be interested in selling them through a sale of the stock. The owner's
purpose is to avoid the double tax imposed in the Court Holding situation. The
question presented, however, is whether the buyer's purchase of assets may
also be considered as a sale of assets by the seller. If the intent of the parties
is given any consideration, the refusal of a seller to sell anything but stock
should preclude the decision that he has sold assets. The question has been
litigated in Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949), and
Steubenville Bridge Co., 11 T.C. 789 (1948), both decisions being in favor of the
taxpayer.
The problem is discussed in Magill, Sale of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47
CoL. L. Ruv. 707 (1947); Mintz, Seven Suggestions for Avoiding Double Taxation When Stock Sale May Be Transfer of Assets, 88 J. AcCOUNTANCY 63 (1949);

Note, Sale of Stock or Purchase of Assets, 4 TAX L. Rnv. 378 (1949).
33. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd
per-curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
34. See Landman, Multiplying Business Corporations And Acquiring Tax
Loses, 8 TAx L. REv. 81, 92 (1952), and cases cited therein.
35. E.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334, 65 Sup. Ct.
707, 89 L. Ed. 981 (1945); Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F.2d
588 (6th Cir. 1938); Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1936);
Thurber v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1936); Prairie Oil & Gas Co.
v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 311 (10th Cir. 1933); Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., P-H 1945
TC MsE.

DEc.

45,248 (1945).
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reversion to the earlier doctrine of Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter 36
and Commissionerv. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.3 7 Since both of these
cases were decided prior to the enactment of section 112 (b) (6) it
would appear that a different result might follow. However, in
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner 8 the rule established
by these cases was upheld. In that case P's milling plant was destroyed
by fire and it collected insurance proceeds as reimbursement for the
loss. Using the insurance proceeds and other money, P acquired 100
per cent of the stock of another mill company. The sole purpose in
purchasing the stock was to acquire the assets of the other company.
The stock was thus surrendered within five days after acquisition of
the assets. P claimed that the basis of the assets in its hands was the
same as in the hands of its transferor as the transaction came within
sections 112 (b) (6) and 113 (a) (15). The Tax Court held that the
purchase of the stock and the immediate liquidation of the corporation must be considered as one transaction, the purchase of the assets. 39
Therefore, section 112 (b) (6) is not applicable and the basis of the assets in P's hands is the cost of the stock. In reaching the decision the
court referred to the Ashland Oil & Refining Co. 40 case and the single
transaction doctrine making it apparent that there is no notion that

section 112 (b) (6) superseded this earlier doctrine. Although there
appears to be a strong argument to the contrary, 4' the latter view is
36. 66 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1933). The question in this case involved the basis
of assets purchased from a corporation which was liquidated and dissolved the
day after the purchase. The assets had a basis of $300,000 to the liquidating
corporation, but the stock was being purchased for $3,350,000. The Commissioner claimed that under the provisions of the applicable revenue act the
transaction constituted a tax-free reorganization and the purchaser acquired
the low basis of the liquidating corporation. The court held that the two steps

constituted a single transaction and that the purchaser was entitled to a basis
equal to the amount paid for the stock.
37. 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939). In this
case the taxpayer corporation desired to obtain the assets of another corporation. It purchased the stock and liquidated shortly thereafter. The court held
that the transaction should be regarded as a whole and that the purchase of
stock was merely a step in the acquisition of the assets. The basis of the assets
was deemed to be the amount paid for the stock.
38. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
39. A recent case reaching this result involved an individual who wanted to
obtain a citrus grove. In the middle of the year he bought up the stock of the
corporation that owned the grove, and in December he liquidated the corporation and took over the grove. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer bought
the stock for the sole purpose of getting the assets; therefore, the purchase of
the stock and the liquidation were really parts of one transaction, namely
a purchase of the property. H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAX
REP. ff 7258 (1953). Although this case did not involve section 112(b) (6),
which applies only to corporations, it indicates the attitude of the court where
there is a purchase solely to obtain assets. Cf. Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368
(1950).
40. See note 37 supra.
41. Mannix, Liquidation of Newly Acquired Subsidiaries, 26 TAXEs 1112,
1114 (1948). See also Magill, Sale of Corporate Stock Assets, 47 COL. L. REy.
707 (1947), where the author states that tax liability should be based upon the

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 7

not without reason.4
In the Kimbell-Diamond case the fair market value of the assets was
greater than the cost of the stock. It was thus the objective of the
Commissioner to establish the lower of these figures as the basis of
the assets. If the situation had been the reverse, however, with the
cost of the stock exceeding the value of the assets, it does not appear
that the Commissioner could successfully reverse his position and contend that there were two separate transactions, a purchase of stock
and a liquidation under section 112 (b) (6), requiring the purchaser
of the stock to retain the low basis for the assets. Nevertheless, the
Commissioner has taken just that position in a case recently decided
by the Tax Court.43 The controversy is a result of the Dallas Downtown Development Company44 case in which the Texas Bank & Trust
Company sought to acquire an office building from the Dallas Downtown Development Company. Negotiations for the purchase of the
building itself having been unsuccessful, a corporation, acting on behalf of the Texas Bank & Trust Company, was formed to purchase the
stock of the Dallas Downtown Development Company. The purchase
price of the stock was $700,000 which was in excess of the basis of the
building in the hands of the former owners. 45 The Dallas Downtown
Development Company was immediately dissolved and the Texas
Bank Building was transferred to a new corporation, the Dallas Investment Company, which was organized for the purpose of placing
a loan on the building. After the loan was made the Texas Bank
Building was immediately transferred to the Texas Bank & Trust
Company. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency against the Dallas
Downtown Development Company as seller and the Texas Bank &
Trust Company as transferee of the assets on the theory that the company sold its building and was, thus, taxable on the gain therefrom.
The Tax Court found that the purchase of the stock of the Dallas
Downtown Development Company was made by the agents of the bank
for the account and benefit of the latter, and further that the only purpose and intent of the bank and its agents in carrying out the transaction was to acquire the bank building through liquidation of the Dallas
Downtown Development Company.46 Therefore, since the bank had
purchased the stock and not the assets, the Court Holding Company
problem was not involved and no tax was due on the sale.
actual facts of a transaction, and not upon the form the transaction might
have taken.
42. Note, 4 TAx L. REV. 378 (1949).

43. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAX REP. ff 7494(M) (1953).
44. 12 T.C. 114 (1949).
45. The same situation existed in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d"
309 (10th Cir. 1933), i.e., a purchase of stock the cost of which exceeded the
basis of the assets. The court there held in favor of the taxpayer giving him
a basis for the assets equal to the cost of the stock. See note 36 supra.
46. 12 T.C. 114, 123 (1949).

COMMENTS

19531

This second action was brought by the Texas Bank & Trust Company
in order to determine the proper basis of the building in its hands. It
had previously taken as its basis for the building the cost of the stock
of the Dallas Downtown Development Company in reliance on the
Kimbell-Diamond case.47 The Commissioner, however, denied its
rights to do so on the grounds that "the Tax Court sustained its position in the prior proceeding and held that the transaction did not involve a purchase and sale of assets but was nothing more than the
purchase and sale of stock just as this petitioner contended." 48 From
this premise the Commissioner concludes that since the petitioner asserted in the prior proceeding that the acquisition of the stock and the
dissolution and liquidation of the Dallas Downtown Development Company were carried out in harmony with section 112 (b) (6), and since
he has now conceded to these contentions, it follows that the result
of such dissolution and liquidation is necessarily the basis provided
for by sections 112 (b) (6) and 113 (a) (15).
At first blush it appears that the Commissioner has a very logical
and well-reasoned argument. However, an analysis of the relevant
cases 49 immediately reveals its weakness. It is conceded in this case
that actually there was a purchase of stock prior to obtaining the assets, but there was also a purchase of stock in Kimbell-Diamond Mill50
ing Co. v. Commissioner,
Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Commis1
sioner and PrairieOil and Gas Co. v. Motter.5 2 The court found in all
of these cases, however, that even though there was a purchase of
stock the intent was essentially to purchase assets in which case the
transaction must be viewed as a whole. Nor is there any substance
to the contention that an inconsistent position is taken by claiming
that the seller is selling stock and the purchaser is purchasing assets.
The purchaser is admittedly purchasing stock, but when the sole purpose is to obtain assets the law ignores the form and treats the transaction as though it were a purchase of assets.5 3
In a memorandum opinion by Judge Turner the Tax Court followed
47. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
48. Brief for Respondent, p. 11, Texas Bank & Trust Co., 5 CCH 1953 FED.
TAX REP.

7494(M) 1953).

49. E.g., K-imbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 47;
Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938);
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1933); H. B. Snively,
19 T.C. 850, 5 CCH 1953
368 (1950).

FED.

TAX REP.

7258 (1953); Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C.

50. See note 47 supra.
51. See note 37 supra.
52. See note 36 supra.
53. "If a taxpayer sought to avoid a tax on the profits of such a sale as this
by asking the Commissi6ner to ignore the actualities, he would shortly and
properly be reminded that taxation is an intensely practical matter and that
the substance of the thing done, and not the form it took, must govern."
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 311 (10th Cir. 1933).
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the above mentioned authorities in deciding the Texas Bank and Trust
Company case. The Court held that the related steps must be treated
as one transaction and that petitioners' basis for the real estate was
the amount paid for the stock. This conclusion appears to be sound in
view of the existing authorities and the fact that it had been previously
adjudicated that the sole purpose of the Texas Bank and Trust Company in purchasing the stock of the Dallas Downtown Development
Company was to acquire its assets, 54 the Texas Bank Building. Although the decision was a memorandum opinion it is important from
the taxpayer's standpoint in that the Commissioner was precluded
from taking a position inconsistent with that taken by him on similar
facts in the Kimbell-Diamond case.
Conclusion
Section 112 (b) (6) was intended to benefit parent corporations by
permitting them to liquidate their subsidiaries without being penalized. Although there are decisions indicating that this result is not
always accomplished, as where recognition of a loss or the purchase
of a higher basis is desired, the failure can usually be attributed to a
lack of proper planning and competent advice. Section 112 (b) (6) is
an elective provision and by strict compliance with the legislative and
judicial requirements it may be either used or discarded at the taxpayer's will. There is one area, however, where reliance cannot be
placed on sections 112 (b) (6) and 113 (a) (15). That is the situation in
which a corporation desiring the assets of another purchases the stock
of the latter and immediately liquidates. The present rule is to view
the transaction as a single act, a purchase of the assets, with the cost
of the stock as the basis of the assets. This, apparently, is the rule that
will be followed regardless of whether the cost of the stock is more or
less than the basis of the assets in the hands of the subsidiary.
54. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949).

